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Abstract	
This	article	examines	the	complex	space	between	the	commodification	and	
decommodification	of	water,	showing	how	civil	society	leaves	these	‘fictitious’	
boxes	behind	in	water	and	sanitation	struggles.		Drawing	on	Polanyi	(1944),	it	
looks	at	how	the	balance	between	what	is	commodified	and	what	is	not,	can	–	
and	is	–	affected	by	the	engagement	between	government	and	civil	society	in	all	
its	forms.		In	response	to	the	local	municipality	implementing	policy	or	
introducing	innovations,	civil	society	in	all	its	forms	responds,	and	acts	as	a	
catalyst	for	significant	policy	shifts.		Important	changes	in	people’s	lives	can	
result	from	civil	society	engagement	with	the	municipality	through	dialogue	and	
negotiation	alongside	protest.		It	examines	this	engagement	in	four	critical	areas	
of	water	and	sanitation	in	Durban,	South	Africa,	namely	connections	and	
disconnections;	water	pricing,	affordability	and	free	basic	water;	dry	sanitation	
and	urine	diversion	toilets;	and	participation	and	citizen	voice.		Although	
constrained	by	structural	realities,	there	is	evidence	that	civil	society	agency	can	
‘make	a	difference’	in	people’s	every	day	lives,	spurring	us	on	to	more	extensive	
policy	challenges	to	widen	this	space,	while	contributing	to	the	development	of	
counter	hegemonic	alternatives.			
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Introduction 
 
Hydropolitics in the global South have been characterised by ideological debates over 
‘commodification’, or the use of market mechanisms to allocate water. The spread of 
‘water wars’ especially since the April 2000 Cochabamba, Bolivia struggle against the 
World Bank and Bechtel, and including the 2003-09 Phiri, Soweto campaign by 
activists against prepayment meters installed by Johannesburg Water, shows that 
these debates have far reaching impacts on poor people’s ability to access water.   
 
Lauded internationally as a top water utility in Africa and largely exceptional, Durban 
is an ideal example of the socio-political change possible through civil society 
challenges. While Durban1 has experienced pockets of intense social protest around 
service delivery, including housing and water, it would be an exaggeration to classify 
these as ‘water wars’.  Civil society has affected water policy in a variety of ways that 
are not as immediately apparent but nonetheless powerful. These include street 
protests and legal action. But they also include dialogues and negotiating with 
eThekwini Water and Sanitation (EWS), Durban’s public water authority, through 
community based and non-government organisations (CBOs and NGOs).    
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Activists and scholars of new social movements focus their attention on street 
protests. Protest can be an important strategy - both as a means of forcing 
governments to change, and as a means of initiating dialogue which then proceeds in 
more social democratic or socialist directions. Yet these other forms of civil society 
organisation engagement are as important – if not more so.   It is this range of civil 
society responses to the municipality’s water and sanitation interventions, including 
innovations that have received numerous international, African, and national 
accolades, that have been a catalyst for technological, financial and social changes 
such as more progressive tariffs and free basic water; emptying of urine diversion 
toilets and productive use of waste; and a nationwide citizen voice project.  
 
In thinking about struggles between civil society and government over 
commodification, it is useful to draw on Polanyi (1944).  Polanyi argued that society 
will resist the extension of market relations into areas seen as threatening to society 
itself – notably with regard to labour and land.  Like labour and land, water could be 
seen as one of Polanyi’s ‘fictitious’ commodities, i.e. goods which have the 
appearance of commodities (in that a price exists) but which can never be fully 
commoditised without threatening the existence of society  (or at least a significant 
part of it).  It is this level of conceptual precision and analysis that Bakker ( 2007) 
calls for as a means to avoid the false dualism between the ideal types of “public” in 
the form of rights and “private” in the form of commodities that “risk reinforcing or 
even reproducing the idealism of neo-liberalism itself” (Sparke 2006 in Bakker 2007). 
It contributes to current debates over urban water governance in eThekwini by 
engaging with the hegemony of governance concepts and practices described by 
Harris et al (2013), provides an analysis of civil society agency that leaves scope for 
people to consider themselves as equal citizens (Hellberg 2014), and refutes Nash’s 
ideological oversimplification of dynamics in eThekwini (2013) by describing 
potential shifts in power relations at the municipal level.  
  
What is particularly interesting about water policy is that it can be partly commodified 
and partly decommodified (for example, by allowing an allocation of free water and 
tariffs above that amount). The balance between what is commodified, and what is 
not, can – and is – affected by dialogue between government and civil society.  To see 
water policy as either commodified or decommodified - in “boxes”- misses this subtle 
dimension. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that in negotiating over the 
balance, civil society may actually consent to some tariffs in order to raise funds for 
local government’s extension of water and other services to needy people. To adopt a 
purist position towards water policy by demanding that water should never be 
commodified at all, misses the very real resource constraints that local governments 
face – and which many people recognise and accept.    
 
As a means of exploring how this balance between commodification and 
decommodification is negotiated, this article examines the interaction between the 
municipality and civil society organisations in four different areas of Durban’s water 
and sanitation provision:  connections and disconnections; water pricing, affordability 
and free basic water; dry sanitation and urine diversion toilets; and public 
participation and citizen’s voice.  It shows that civil society engagement with EWS, in 
all its forms, can achieve and promote progressive policy change that has a significant 
and immediate impact on citizens’ lives in the metro. This engagement is critical to 
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deepening the democracy (Fung and Wright 2003) for which so many people 
struggled and died. 
 
The analysis emphasises the agency of researchers and activists to engage with the 
municipality to improve both its approach to citizens and its service delivery.2  In the 
spirit of Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol (1985), it points to changes that have 
taken place under a democratic government and with committed, capable civil 
servants and engaged citizens over the course of a decade.   
 
However it is important to note the limitations to agency within the Durban context.  
Structuralists may argue that the failure of South Africa’s ‘elite transition’ to 
fundamentally change the economic structure means that water is another example of 
the urban ‘class apartheid’ which replaced racial apartheid. Although well-intentioned 
civil servants may be committed to delivery, the limits to water access are dictated by 
the political-economic structure of liberal-democratic capitalism and fiscal austerity 
pressure.  Alterations to policies and practices through increasingly participatory 
routes may create a compelling ’human face’, but they have not changed the nature of 
structural imperatives and therefore they legitimise neo-liberalism (Bond 2002, 2006).  
While there is some merit to this criticism, it is of limited practical relevance because 
nothing short of a radical change of governing structures is seen as progressive.  Such 
an analysis is limited also in that it pays insufficient attention to the real, every-day 
struggles of people to improve their lives within the constraints of a liberal market 
democracy.  
 
An alternate view is that such innovations create openings for people to contest the 
extent of commodification, to redistribute income and resources, and to develop 
counter-hegemonic alternatives which could affect the nature of capitalism itself.  
There is a lot of room for manoeuvre to push policy in more social democratic or 
socialist directions – thereby facilitating a more egalitarian socio-economic structure.    
Understanding water policy developments in Durban as the outcome of a Polanyian 
‘double movement’  by civil society using different strategies, is useful in  guiding 
current and future struggles to improve water and sanitation access on the part of both 
officials and civil society.   
 
Although it is not possible to assert a direct causal link between relations with civil 
society and policy change, this article explores dynamics between civil society actors 
and officials who were asked to interpret their own actions, events and their impact on 
policy change.  It is based on primary data from the municipality, which has not been 
publically released; longitudinal interviews with eThekwini Water and Sanitation 
officials over a five year period; interviews with key informants and social movement 
leaders; and a review of secondary literature. The overall context for the article is 
based on  participatory observation through the author’s work in the water sector over 
the past two decades.3 For validation reasons, Neil Macleod, then Head of EWS, read 
the article submitted for publication and indicated that there were no factual errors.  
 
 
Protest forces engagement with civil society: Disconnections 
 
While Durban has made impressive progress with new connections, its disconnections 
have been the focus of analysis—and civil society action.  In Durban, the 
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municipality, through eThekwini Water and Sanitation, is responsible for the 
provision of infrastructure and the maintenance and operations of water systems. This  
section discusses how EWS’s success in addressing backlogs and establishing new 
water connections meant the end of free water provided under apartheid and the 
introduction of cost recovery and painful water restriction practices.  This 
commodification of water resulted in citizen protest not to decommodify water 
completely, but to utilize a fairly administered system that respects people’s right to 
water.  This battle to partial decommodification was won on the streets and in court. 
The municipality found an improved method of restricting, not disconnecting, water 
to the free basic amount or what people can afford.  Of course the City held to its 
position of charging people for water over the free basic amount, but civil society 
influenced the manner in which this is done.  Many users then shifted to ongoing 
engagement with the City—with both parties aware of the possibility of resumed 
protest-- allowing for a practical and immediate response to problems with 
implementation.   
 
Since 1994 South Africa’s central water challenge has been on rapid rollout of water 
systems and lowering backlog numbers.4 In eThekwini municipality, referred to here 
as “Durban metro”, the second largest metro with nearly  three and a half million 
residents5, the City reports that its water provision backlog of 250,000 households in 
1997 was brought down to 17 000 households by 2009 (Macleod interview, 18 
October 2009).  This was notwithstanding the absorption of vast backlogs from 
neighbouring peri-urban areas when Durban’s boundaries were expanded in 2000, the 
rapid influx of people from rural KwaZulu Natal as well as migrants and refugees 
from other countries.  Such rapid urbanization resulted in sprawling peri-urban areas 
where shack settlements create a persistent challenge for the municipality.6 
 
So, with  the exception of households in informal settlements or relatively new to 
Durban, the issue faced by poor households is not gaining infrastructure but avoiding 
disconnections. Disconnections are a way to establish “a credible threat of cutting 
service” to those who are not paying their water bills.7 From 1999-2004, national 
water minister Ronnie Kasrils and his civil society critics vigorously debated the 
number of people who had suffered from water disconnections between the end of 
apartheid and 2003. Then Director General of the national Department of Water 
Affairs, Mike Muller (2004), conceded that in 2003 alone, 275 000 households, or 
nearly 1.5 million people, were disconnected from water services at least once due to 
inability to pay.8  In this context, the level of dissatisfaction about water 
disconnections during these first post-apartheid years is not surprising.   
 
Research has reported an ‘inhumane’ number of disconnections in Durban (Loftus 
2005a:250)  In a 2003 interview, Macleod, head of eThekwini Water and Sanitation, 
said that the municipality was disconnecting an average of 800 to 1000 households 
daily, or 4000 to 5000 per week, affecting an estimated 25 000 people (Loftus 
2005b).  Disconnections were the focus of protest through a 2001 court case between 
the Council and one of the Concerned Citizen members, Christina Manquele,who 
argued that her right to water was breached by disconnections.  The court case was 
ultimately lost on the basis that she had not limited herself to free basic water and 
tried to reconnect illegally. The municipality then stated that, instead of cutting off 
people’s water, it would use tricklers so that everyone could access the free basic 
water amount (Loftus 2005b; Desai 2002).  
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Loftus concludes that the implementation of free basic water in Durban ironically 
meant that ‘a right to water is thus accomplished with a clampdown on many 
households’ access to water’ (Loftus 2005b).  Although he acknowledges the fact that 
the municipality used the word ‘disconnections’ to refer to water restrictions through 
a trickler9, this technology was considered so objectionable that there was no 
differentiation by both researchers or citizens between restriction and ‘clampdown’.  
The word ‘disconnection’ created the impression of the supply no longer working at 
all, as this is essentially what people experienced.   
Indeed it was the dreaded “trickler”, alongside huge faulty bills due to dilapidated 
infrastructure, which drove Chatsworth residents to protest by using a range of 
actions including street protests, illegal connections, and legal action:  
“Local government is bending under citizen movements’ pressure.  In 
Chatsworth neighbourhoods of Bayview, Crossmoor and Westcliff, for 
example, water is now flowing where it once was restricted.  The reason is a 
ten year mobilisation by the Flatdwellers Association, initially supported by 
the Durban Concerned Citizen Forum organised by Prof Fatima Meer.  
Strategies and tactics in the water wars ranged from street protests and 
widespread illegal connections to intense negotiations with state officials” 
(Bond and Naidoo 2008).  
   
After an eight year disconnection battle in which some people reconnected themselves 
and widened the drip hole in tricklers, and physically fought those sent to disconnect 
water to the point that they came accompanied by guards, the City agreed to a 
moratorium on evictions and services disconnections in 2007.  It also “began 
rehabilitating leaky plumbing and faulty electrical wiring throughout the flats… 
Chatsworth activists have won some battles but face others because after upgrading 
the city will install built in restrictors on consumption” (Bond and Naidoo 2008).   
 
However the dynamic between city and citizen had shifted from battle to discussion 
and negotiation.  Orlean Naidoo, a prominent member of the Westcliff Flats Residents 
Association, recounts how she discussed the misapplication of fixed property value 
and water loss charges with a Durban water official, who then identified it as an IT 
problem and ensured it was corrected.  She states that ‘If there is a problem with the 
bureaucracy, they have an ‘open door policy’. She explained that:  
“when flow limiters10 were installed, the water department was very good, 
they came with officials and did education on debt relief and people signed for 
meters.  There were 18 workshops in our area. People are allowed to choose 
whether to have a flow limiter installed, even if they are in debt—provided 
that they pay their current bill. I have been monitoring people’s bills and they 
are very low, some people are not even paying anything” (Naidoo personal 
interview, 22 June 2010).   
 
It is this shift to engagement that many academic and policy analyses fail to 
acknowledge, whether due to inadequate engagement with technical data or 
disinterest in capturing subtle changes that are often perceived as weakening the 
movement.  Although important progress has been made in the use of flow limiters 
rather than tricklers, and in the improved communication between the municipality 
and its citizens, reports still fail to differentiate between flow limiters and full 
disconnections from repeated tampering.  They miss the fact that even the new flow 
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limiters in Chatsworth (and elsewhere) may be captured in data as disconnections.11  
In 2008 the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) reported that 15,106 
households in eThekwini were disconnected over a six month period (Tissington et al, 
2008).  Yet the number of “actual” disconnections or ferrule disconnections 
(removing the connection at the mains) was twelve times less than reported by CALS: 
instead of 15,000 for less than six months, the accurate figure is 2,529 over the period 
of a year. And this was done after tampering for the third time.12 In other words, civil 
society engagement with EWS resulted in new policies that leave scope for 
negotiation with EWS and result in many fewer actual disconnections.  
 
The case of Chatsworth shows how the Polanyian dynamic played out at the local 
level in terms of disconnections.  Citizens actively and consistently resisted the way 
in which the commodified cost recovery approach was applied locally by the 
municipality, EWS eventually responded with constructive changes, and 
communication and negotiation between the municipality and residents now exist and 
generally work for both parties.  In short, militancy ended with expansive negotiation 
between the parties and changes not only to municipal water policy and practice in 
Chatsworth but also to wider Durban. If this communication is sustained, it may level 
a more fundamental challenge to a how citizens perceive themselves in relation to the 
City, as described by Hellberg (2014). 
 
Of course the on-going relationship between civil society and the municipality does 
not end there; civil society, whether progressive NGOs and CBOs, social movements, 
or citizens themselves, continues to find openings to challenge the impacts of 
commodification. While civil society exerted its power and made important gains, it 
continues to monitor the application of policy and its effect on citizens-- such as large, 
poor households who cannot live within the free basic water allocation.  One way to 
distinguish between large poor households and those not wanting to pay is to bill 
according to the number of household members.  To date municipal officials in 
Durban and elsewhere insist on the impracticability and exorbitant cost of such 
billing, but have not yet found an alternative method.  While this reflects a typical 
municipal reaction of first considering cost, we may expect some adjustment 
following more concerted civil society engagement. 
 
  
Dialogue in the context of legalism: affordable water  
 
Affordability and FBW were the main focus of struggle in the 2000s, but civil society 
engagement with the municipality resulted in an increase in the FBW allocation and 
positive changes in the tariff structure to the extent that citizens no longer note them 
as main concerns (Neilson 2010).  Their positive impact on citizen’s every-day 
experience of being able to afford water resulted in a payment level across the 
municipality of 96 per cent and an annual drop in disconnections by 10 per cent 
(Scruton personal correspondence, 22 June 2010).  This section will consider civil 
society engagement as a key factor behind positive changes in FBW and the tariff 
structure; civil society and trade unions had regular, structured interactions with 
national and local government, and the private sector over a four year period through 
The Water Dialogues.  Together they engaged with complex and contested issues of 
water and sanitation delivery.13    
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The starting point for affordability considerations in Durban was its setting the trend 
of providing Free Basic Water of 6 kilolitres per household per month in 1998.14 The 
rationale behind its introduction was rooted in concern for the poor alongside 
mounting pressure from civil society and was pursued once this amount was identified 
as the break- even point for the cost of administering bills.15  There is no doubt that 
this was a welcome change for people struggling to pay for water, and makes South 
Africa stand apart from other southern countries.    
 
A debate over water pricing raged alongside FBW, as many households used more 
than the 6kl FBW allotment. The tariff structure in Durban had only three steps, and 
the first step or payment band was so high these households found themselves with 
large and often unpayable bills.  A study by Bailey and Buckley (2005) showed that the 
real price of an average litre of water consumed by billed residents with the lowest-
income had more than doubled between 1997 and 2003.  More importantly, this price 
increase resulted in their average consumption falling from 22 to 15 kl/household/month, 
showing that the price change had a significant negative impact on poor people 
accessing a basic need.16   
 
Making a similar point, the United Nations Development Programme’s 2006 Human 
Development Report compared Durban to several other Third World cities, showing 
that it had by far the highest prices in the 6-20 kl/month range, the block in which 
many of the lowest-income people consume, as demonstrated in Figure 1 (Watkins 
2006).  
 
Figure 1: UNDP comparisons of water pricing in selected Third World cities 
 
Source: UNDP 2006. 
 
The pressure of unfavourable public reports on Durban’s tariffs, resources freed by 
diminishing numbers of households requiring new services, and the cost and negative 
impact on consumer relations of installing a high number of restrictors in response to 
non-payment set the scene for the municipality to make water more affordable for 
poor people in two ways.    
 8 
 
 
First, in 2007/08, Macleod introduced two new steps in the tariff so that it has five 
bands.  One new step makes the first band after FBW more affordable, while the other 
raises the tariff for over consumption (or luxury consumption).  It is likely that EWS 
was influenced by Bailey and Buckley’s report, which suggested that higher price 
increases would not adversely affect revenue inflow from the upper income bracket. 
While the tariff curve could be still more concave,17 this was an important step 
nonetheless, as it increases affordability and penalises high consumption. In fact, as a 
result of these tariff changes, average household consumption dropped from 30kl per 
family per month in 1997 to just less than 24kl per month in 2010 (Macleod email, 22 
June 2010). While a breakdown of price elasticity by income bracket is needed for a 
full analysis, it is likely that the drop in usage is primarily from high end users.    
 
Second, in 2009, eThekwini Water and Sanitation increased the amount of FBW from 
6kl to 9kl. Macleod explains that this was a result of his increased engagement with 
civil society, both through pilots of user platforms in eThekwini and particularly 
through his participation in The Water Dialogues process over a four year period 
(Galvin 2009:3). Here civil society organisations including unions, NGOs, and social 
movements repeatedly provided detailed accounts of problems faced by poor people 
in accessing water.   
 
It is likely that Macleod’s openness to consider changes promoted by civil society  
groups was bolstered by protest taking place in court and in the streets.  This  
was the period when Johannesburg Water (on whose board Macleod served) was 
enmeshed in a high-profile court case on water that reached the Constitutional Court 
and service delivery protests were witnessed all over South Africa (Alexander  
2010). However this remained a backdrop in Durban, which witnessed  
only five service delivery protests that possibly included water and sanitation  
issues.18    
 
Together civil society dialogue, backed by citizen protest, again challenged the  
nature of commodification and won important gains that made water more  
affordable for poor Durban residents. 
 
  
Quiet resistance to “innovative technology”: Urine Diversion Toilets  
 
EWS is often recognised for its innovations, including the introduction of Urine 
Diversion toilets (UDs)19.  This section describes how people are expressing their 
non-acceptance of UDs through everyday forms of resistance, which has led EWS to 
pursue further innovations to use waste productively.  This may lead to improved 
usage and emptying or, despite these efforts, citizens and civil society may embark on 
a “louder” round of pressure for the municipality to take full responsibility for UD 
emptying.  This section traces the development of UDs as a neo-liberal step to make 
citizens responsible for their own waste, citizen resistance, and present innovations to 
increase citizen acceptance.  Behind the innovations, EWS is feeling the pressure 
from citizens, NGOs and councillors, and is quietly reassuming responsibility for 
waste. 
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Sanitation poses a serious challenge to the municipality, particularly in the rural areas 
absorbed into Durban when its municipal boundaries were extended in 2000.  With 
the outbreak of cholera in that year, the City was under serious pressure to provide 
sanitation to these areas virtually overnight. Science magazine reported: 
 “A cholera outbreak in Durban in 2000, which killed more than 70 people and 
infected tens of thousands in poor neighborhoods, increased pressure on 
Macleod’s unit to speed up water service and sanitation improvements…There 
were about 100,000 pit toilets in Durban, which posed disease-transmission 
problems when they were full. And they often were, because the hilly areas on 
the outskirts of the city are inaccessible to vacuum tankers that pump out deep 
pits.”  (Koenig 2008).  
 
Due to problems with Ventilated Improved Pits (VIPs)20, the decision was made to 
instead provide dry sanitation in the form of UD shallow double-pit toilets, which 
separate urine from faeces to allow the latter to dry and decompose faster.  UDs were 
also considered an eco-option, requiring no water and, based on the Swedish 
experience, using dried faecal matter as compost.  90 000 UDs were rolled out from 
2000 to date (Gounden 2014).  There is little question that the introduction of UDs 
was handled very poorly. Officials explain that the education around use of UDs was 
organised through local councillors, who are their bosses and the democratically 
elected leaders. Councillors were tasked with outsourcing education to Institutional 
and Social Development (ISD) trainers. Only a handful of trainers fulfilled their terms 
of reference adequately (Umphilo waManzi and UCL, 2010). Households were 
advised to bury the composted waste in a hole and to plant a tree there (Buckley 
personal interview, 6 May 2010).21   
 
The introduction of UDs raised significant questions about user and City 
responsibility for sanitation.  If UDs do not produce human compost that can be of 
benefit users,  households  are forced to take on responsibility for maintaining toilets 
so that they can be provided with one.  The  City’s commodified, market approach is 
evident in its shifting of both responsibility and cost for emptying toilets to 
households. This has led some researchers to refer to UDs as ‘the neoliberal loo’ 
(Amisi, Bond, Khumalo and Nojiyeza, 2008). Penner (2010) goes into more detail, 
describing EWS’s ‘preference for self-contained sanitation options’ as being 
consistent with a ‘more troubling pattern in the world’s water and sanitation 
community, where costs and maintenance responsibilities are being shifted onto users 
as a matter of (neoliberal) policy’.  She asks: 
If the main aim of the government is to improve public health, then is it wise 
to make householders responsible for moving potentially infectious matter? 
Rather than making public health paramount, this closed system, which puts 
users in charge of maintaining their own infrastructure and disposing of their 
own feces, transfers labour and risk from public bodies onto individual 
householders” (Penner 2010). 
This is far from the public-public model that is often promoted as a means of the state 
working with citizens around the operation of services (Galvin 2016). 
  
UDs have not been a welcome solution to poor sanitation options at the local level. 
While an extensive survey of households in eThekwini showed that a high percentage 
of households continue to use their UDs, they also express their dissatisfaction (Roma 
et al 2013). In depth interviews in five wards found that households take issue with 
 10 
 
not being given a choice of toilets22, receiving inadequate education on UD use, and 
having to empty them (Galvin and Nojiyeza 2011; Adriaan, Ngcobo, and Mngoma 
2010).   
 
As a result, many UDs are not used as toilets but as storage cupboards. Instead of 
using UDs, households revert to former pit toilets, or presumably to open defecation.  
In some outlying rural areas, a number of seemingly better off households have 
transformed their UD toilets into flush toilets, using a type of French drain.  
Considered a self-upgrade, these changes defeat the very purpose of using minimal 
water, will be expensive to use when the area is billed for water usage, and may result 
in groundwater contamination. (Galvin and Nojiyeza 2011)  
  
The non-use and self-upgrade of toilets is an ‘everyday form of resistance’, a response 
described by Scott (1992) in Domination and the Arts of Resistance. People in many 
areas are resisting UDs because they do not understand the City’s reasoning and 
failure to provide choices or to explain how UDs can work. They are stating their case 
by not using the toilet, by showing that a safe storage area is more important to them 
or by changing the very nature of UDs (Galvin and Nojiyeza 2011).  This is the 
‘hidden transcript’, a collective ‘discourse that takes place ‘offstage’ beyond direct 
observation by power holders’, that makes people using it feel that they have finally 
‘spoken truth to power’. It is ‘essential to any dynamic view of power relations’ (Scott 
1992:4, 9). 
  
The reality is that few users engage the municipality directly until an issue becomes 
one that is clearly hurting them. If they voice dissatisfaction, their expectations are 
regarded as unrealistic and any lack of understanding is blamed on the ISD appointed 
by the Councilor. (Galvin and Nojiyeza 2011) This creates a sense of a closed shop in 
which EWSofficials maintain control and resistance from users remains low profile. 
According to organisational theory, significant policy change would occur as a result 
of a crisis of some kind, inside or outside the organisation (Grindle and Thomas 
1991).  For example, this could take the form of public health problems resulting from 
the non-use of toilets or their not being emptied properly.   
 
What is needed is a social approach that involves citizens in discussion from the 
outset and gives them a voice and a sense of involvement. This is the participation 
that people yearn for (Friedman 2005), but frightens officials who worry about the 
rejection of their plans by users, which would cause problems with their political 
bosses in the Council.23  
Over the past years, there have been a range of responses and counter-responses.  First 
EWS stopped outsourcing education. Even more importantly, it eagerly pursued 
innovations expected to make UDs more attractive to citizens so that they accept and 
use the toilets. For example, EWS began experimenting with a machine that uses high 
temperatures to turn the UD compost into pellets that are safe to use as fertilizer 
(Macleod presentation, 9 March 2011), and piloted buying people’s urine from their 
UDs to extract phosphorous, a finite resource needed for farming that is reaching its 
peak (Veith 2010).  While these innovative incentives are shocking to what some 
EWS officials refer to as a “faeces phobic” population, they force people to think 
about the future of human waste management.   
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In 2010 councilors complained publically about UDs and promised to deliver flush 
toilets to all citizens (Adriaan, Ngcobo and Mngoma 2010).  Officials hold that 
Council approved UD rollout and councillors are disregarding the financial and water 
resource expense of flush toilets.  Meanwhile the City gained international recognition 
as the Gates Foundation provided significant support to EWS to test technological 
innovations emerging from its “Toilet Challenge”.   
 
There are signs that the municipality will quietly reassume responsibility for emptying 
toilets, in the guise of yet another technical innovation that is expected to produce 
funds and become self-sustainable, the Black Soldier Fly Project. Contractors will 
empty UD toilets every two years, and transport compost to a central cite where it is 
mixed with organic matter.  Solider flies feed on this mixture and produce larvae, 
which are processed into animal feed (Gounden interview 2015). The pilot has not yet 
been rolled out, but people have heard that their toilets will be emptied.  Once it is 
introduced, monitoring this service will require civil society vigilance. 
 
This section has shown how UDs sparked everyday forms of resistance that resulted 
in improved construction, new educational efforts, a focus on innovation to increase 
UD acceptance, and a reassumption of responsibility for its citizens’ waste—all 
without open, “loud” engagement with the City. However, if these changes do not 
result in greater and improved use of UDs, it is likely that public health problems will 
begin to harm citizens, and that the nature of civil society engagement will adjust 
toward more visible action that forces state power to re-consider its responsibility for 
service provision.  
 
 
Deepening Public Participation: ‘Citizens’ Voice’ 
 
As in most municipalities in South Africa, eThekwini Water and Sanitation’s 
approach was to engage with its users though extremely limited forms of consultation 
and one way communication (Galvin 2009).  From 2005 onwards, officials began to 
recognise the need for on-going participation and dialogue around systemic issues.  
This section shows how the municipality’s engagement with citizens changed, as a 
result of its experience with an early pilot project on user platforms run in conjunction 
with the University of KwaZulu Natal, exposure to public participation debates 
through The Water Dialogues, and the commissioning of a large NGO to conduct 
‘citizens’ voice’ training (Wilson, Malakoana, and Gounden, 2008; Galvin 2009; 
Smith 2010).  EWS subsequently took on the setting up and running citizens’ voice 
user platforms itself.  This section will describe how civil society initiatives 
influenced the municipality and the resultant changes in its approach to citizens. 
 
As part of a 2005 university study, researchers from the University of KwaZulu Natal 
engaged the City in establishing user platforms (Wilson, Malakoana, and Gounden, 
2008). This was an early step toward community communication with EWS, although 
the way it was structured did not necessarily create opportunities for users to hold 
officials to account but rather allowed officials to pick and choose what to respond to.  
It could be used either as good public relations for the City, an extension of the 
already established approaches of road show type events and ‘consumer consultation’, 
or to broaden EWS’ concept of community participation.   
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Around the same time, Macleod became active in The Water Dialogues, a national 
multi-stakeholder group engaging in research on the impact of institutional choices on 
water delivery. One of the main points of discussion was whether municipalities were 
engaging in largely procedural consultation rather than participation.  Macleod has 
publically stated how his interactions with Water Dialogues stakeholders changed his 
view of civil society and resulted in his making significant policy changes vis a vis 
civil society (Galvin 2009).   
 
Building on positive experience with the university’s user platform pilot study, 
Macleod approached a fellow Water Dialogues stakeholder about extending her 
ground-breaking ‘Citizens’ Voice’ project to Durban.24  Briefly this entailed a two 
day training of 70 to 100 people from civil society in each of 17 zones, feedback from 
the municipality on issues raised and the identification of people to serve on the user 
platform. The aim is to familiarise trainees with water and sanitation policy and their 
rights and responsibilities, enabling them to articulate problems repeatedly 
experienced at the household level into broader systemic issues. User platforms then 
meet at regular intervals to provide a structure for engagement between the 
municipality and civil society, comprised of local government ward committees, 
civics, and CSOs (Gounden interview, 3 June 2010). 
 
The introduction of this initiative by the Mvula Trust, a large water sector NGO, with 
support from a caucus comprised of local activists, was politically sensitive.  This is 
predominantly because the starting point for EWS engagement was to rebuild a sense 
of trust between councillors, civil society and officials.  Facing pressure from its 
councillors around their mandated role vis a vis that of civil society representatives, 
EWS had its own ideas about how the project should unfold in order to meet this 
objective. As a result its NGO partnership was ultimately relied on for 
technical/community engagement expertise rather than as an equal partner in driving 
the project forward.   
 
From the start, EWS had the intention of turning this programme into an on-going 
initiative and thus ensured that its own staff was trained on the ‘Citizens’ Voice’ 
approach so that the municipality itself could run the programme beyond an initial 
piloting, done in partnership with NGOs.   In addition to cost considerations, the 
municipality took on the programme with an impeccable logic of such programmes 
resting in public hands, building public institutional capacity to implement them, and 
the municipality establishing its own direct relationship with communities.25   
Included as a component of the National Water Regulation Strategy, the Citizen’s 
Voice initiative was anticipated to be extended throughout the country.   Yet years 
after its inclusion, there was no sign of its wider application, until in 2015 the Chief 
Director of Economic and Social Regulation met with EWS to learn from its 
experience and to inform the planned implementation of a national citizen’s voice 
programme (Gounden interview 2015).  
 
Originally this initiative seemed to have the potential to promote greater public 
participation in fundamental ways.  EWS points to significant changes that it made 
based on its learnings from interactions with citizens: redesigning its bills based on 
user forum feedback, increasing FBW to 9kl, and introducing its water amnesty 
initiative while improving call centre responsiveness to leaks past international best 
practice. There appears to be scope for citizens to get EWS to change its thinking, 
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approach and policies, moving past perfunctory participation to open engagement 
with citizens.   
 
However its likelihood is circumscribed by the present conjuncture of Councillors at 
the local level and at the municipal level.  Councillors want to control their areas 
through ward committees and block out real participation, all underpinned by a 
problematic electoral system heavily weighted toward proportional representation and 
a political culture not mature enough or too scared to create and vote for independent 
parties at the local level.  Perhaps ironically one of the most noticeable improvements 
EWS has experienced from this initiative is that councillors feel more confident about 
their understanding of the sector through their participation in user platforms. This has 
enabled councillors to play their role more effectively in bringing this learning 
forward into ward committee meetings (Smith 2011).  
 
While user platforms work for the City when they can educate people on its approach, 
resolve a conflictual situation and get their “buy in”,  the control of the process by the 
municipality mean that they are a form of ‘paternal participation’. This  is an example 
of the tension between a traditional hierarchal approach to governance and a network 
approach (van de Meene et al 2011). It is not clear whether the hierarchical approach  
emanates from officials’ attitudes toward community members or whether it is a result 
of Councillors trying to obstruct the city’s attempts to engage citizens.  Councillors 
typically argue that they represent citizens and their needs, and that the involvement 
of organised civil society undermines this role.  So this is a standoff in agency 
between local officials and civil society leaders.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Maintaining an ideological purity between commodification and decommodification 
threatens to oversimplify and render invisible a variety of state-society interactions 
that are moving water and sanitation struggles forward.  Instead of trying to ascertain 
whether the municipality or civil society has compromised its position, it is important 
to consider the agency of civil society, whether citizens or NGOs, to resist and 
discuss, and to influence municipal policies.  Understanding this interaction will 
contribute to current and future struggles to improve water and sanitation access on 
the part of both officials and social justice activists. 
The contribution of this article is to show how this movement results from a range of 
civil society engagement, not from protest alone.  In Durban, examples of 
disconnections, FBW and UDs show how the municipality introduced problematic or 
even damaging policies and, in response,  civil society engaged with EWS through a 
variety of approaches that won the attention and response of EWS. . Eventually the 
EWS refined its policy, resulting in improved service delivery that people are 
generally satisfied with, although requiring vigilance in holding the municipality 
accountable.  The push toward commodification described by Polanyi will certainly 
continue in the water sector, but civil society provides important counter-pressure 
through a range of engagements with the municipality.   
This paper outlined three specific areas in which civil society exerted this counter-
pressure. Civil society’s response to affordability and free basic water was an 
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assertive straight talk through the Water Dialogues and other fora, which ultimately 
persuaded officials to initiate a change.  Civil society’s response to Urine Diversion 
Toilets is a form of everyday resistance, using them as storage sheds or converting 
them to flush toilets in many areas, resulting in pressure for the municipality to create 
incentives for their use before a public health crisis emerges.  Finally the citizens’ 
voice initiative created space for citizens to engage with the municipality.  Largely as 
a result of this engagement,  EWS recognises water and sanitation as a human right 
through free basic water and its extension, provides toilets in rural areas that meet 
environmental and people’s needs while working to improve their social acceptance, 
and creates channels to regularly engage with citizens to improve delivery of services.  
It also adopts policies so it can support delivery and cross subsidisation and afford to 
operate and maintain systems, making them more equitable and user friendly, through 
a five step tariff and flow limiters that can assist people to balance their water use and 
affordability if administered fairly.   
While EWS is a well-resourced leader in terms of its income, financial reserves, 
independence and skilled personnel, it confronts the limitations of South African 
economic and political structures as well as massive inequality and pervasive poverty, 
We can still wish that the South African transition had been less reformist, 
undertaking structural changes that would have better equipped people to survive and 
prosper. But we cannot act today from a place of wishing away the past to the extent 
that it prevents us from honestly confronting present challenges and opportunities.  
Instead we need to use civil society engagement in all its forms to widen power and 
develop anti-hegemonic alternatives-- while improving people’s everyday lives.  This 
is what the citizens of South Africa deserve. 
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1 Durban is correctly used to refer to the city centre, while eThekwini refers to the entire metropolitan 
area that includes surrounding peri-rural and rural areas.  This article refers to the wider area as 
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Durban.  While this is technically incorrect, Durban is generally a more commonly recognised and 
easily accessible name.  
2 Some people who engaged with eThekwini Water and Sanitation around its approach to citizens 
include Zoe Wilson, Laila Smith, Orlean Naidoo, Bryan Ashe, and individuals from the People’s 
Budget Process.  
3 This has included coordinating a provincial network of local community organisations through the 
Regional Consultative Forum on Rural Development in the 1990s, assisting with  the development of 
new participatory methods to report on citizen’s experience with municipal water delivery with the 
Human Sciences Research Council in the early 2000s, managing an extensive research and multi-
stakeholder dialogue process as head of the Water Dialogues-South Africa through 2000s and then 
establishing and directing a NGO that conducts action research, largely in eThekwini.  Through much 
of this period she was a member of the South African Water Caucus, a network of progressive civil 
society organisations, and the national organiser of the Council of Canadians’ Blue Planet Project—as 
well as serving on the Water Sector Leadership group and working as a consultant for the Department 
of Water Affairs and Oxfam Australia around water programmes. To date she moderates a national 
multi-stakeholder listserv on critical water sector issues. 
4 This refers to a “basic” level of service, typically using the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme’s short term rather than medium term definition (25 litres instead of 50-60 litres per capita 
per day within 200 meters).  Government’s focus has been on rapid rollout to all people, but there is 
increasing recognition by all stakeholders that this was at the expense of operations and maintenance 
(Galvin 2009), often done without quality or sustainability in mind (Bond 2002, McDonald and Pape 
2002, McDonald and Ruiters 2005).  
5 According to Stats SA (www.statssa.gov.za), the 2011 Census recorded 3.442 million residents in 
eThekwini municipality. 
6 Macleod reports that providing services past the basic entry level in informal settlements is 
constrained by the environment's ability to absorb the waste water generated, meaning that ‘further 
upgrading is only possible once formal housing is constructed and settlement densities are reduced’ 
(Macleod interview, 30 April 2010). 
7 The impact of the sudden introduction of cost recovery on many areas was evident in rural 
Ngwelezane, the epicentre of a major cholera epidemic in 2000 (Hemson 2001). 
8 This excludes people with insufficient funds for pre-paid meters (Bond and Dugard 2008). 
9 Tricklers looks like a five rand coin with a very small hole fitted onto taps, allowing just enough 
water to trickle through to provide the free basic water amount.  Macleod reports that these will be 
phased out, as flow limiters achieve the same purpose. 
10 Flow limiters allow for the use of a daily, mutually agreed upon amount of water; then the supply 
switches off until the next day.  They were designed for Durban’s needs, used by indebted households 
to access no more than the 300 litres of free basic water per day or by households wanting to limit their 
daily consumption to an agreed upon higher amount (Macleod email, 22 June 2010).  
11 Flow limiters can carry over the amount of water not used until the next day over one month, but 
they were not programmed to do so (Naidoo interview 22 June 2010). 
12 Analyses seem to have missed the City’s use of the word “disconnection” to mean both a restriction, 
previously a trickler and now a flow limiter, and “ferrule disconnection” in which the City removes a 
connection after household tampering three times. To show the significance of this difference, the 
author sought a breakdown of disconnection statistics from Durban water:  
“During the one year period from June 2009 to June 2010, the City implemented a total of 123, 867 
restrictions and disconnections. Of this, 73,239 users paid their outstanding bills in full and were 
reconnected with full water supply. The remainder were comprised of:  
Full disconnections for vacant properties   4,323 
Full disconnection domestic (for tampering)  2,529 
Paid installed flow limiter          40,789 
Restricted on disk (trickler)         2,987” 
(Gounden email correspondence, 23 June 2010).  
13 See www.waterdialogues.org. 
14 Macleod estimates a cost in the region of R40 million to change administration to charge individuals.   
15 This explanation was provided by Neil Macleod to the author on a number of occasions, including 
interviews in 2011.  
16 Price elasticity for water (the impact of price on demand) for the poorest third of residents was -0.55 
compared to -0.15 and -0.11 for middle and high income water users.  A possible contributing factor is 
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the extension of city boundaries to include many peri-rural, low income residents who consume less 
water. 
17 Arguably the City is influenced by a political drive to protect the economic elite from a steep price 
increase. Financially it fears the revenue repercussions of a more concave tariff curve. If price elasticity 
proves to be high for the wealthy, the City will lose the “goose that lays the golden egg” as high 
income consumers change their behaviour and consume less. Then the City would either need to raise 
the price still higher for high consumption levels, so as to achieve the appropriate revenue levels, or 
charge poor consumers more to cover the shortfall.  Macleod says the Council’s concern about this 
prevented him from proposing the new tariff structure earlier. 
 18 Although ‘Terrains of Civil and Uncivil Society in Durban- 2009 Protests’ www.ccs.ukzn.ac.za 
highlights the significance of the high number of protests overall, my conclusion is based on a detailed 
examination of Durban protests. 
19 Most accurately toilets should be referred to as UDTs (Urine Diversion Toilets) or UDDTs (Urine 
Diversion Dry Toilets); here the term “UDs” is used as it is the way that the toilets are commonly 
known. 
20 Almost all VIPs more than five years old are unusable ‘full-ups’ (Eales 2005).  Their location often  
makes emptying virtually impossible or extremely expensive.  The City commissioned Hunt Lascaris 
to study people’s choice of toilet, which found that users were strongly opposed to VIPs (Shangase 
2009).   
21 The pathogen load and long lifespan of some worms made the dried solid waste too risky for use as 
compost in Durban. 
22 While EWS’ water borne edge maps the limit of sewerage provision, the relative proximity of flush 
toilets raises painful equity issues and fosters citizen resistance in some areas receiving UDs.  
23 This is the dynamic that appears in the press, in which vocal Councillors have equated UDs as the 
equivalent of bucket toilets.  While these allegations have not made a noticeable difference in the 
continued implementation of UDs, they are likely to have made officials more circumspect in their 
approach. 
24 The Cape Town pilot influenced Durban, but also created the basis for a bottom-up approach to 
regulation nationally as it appears in DWA’s regulation strategy. 
25 This brought to the fore underlying issues concerning the overall ownership of the project, as well as 
how to monitor and protect its integrity, impartiality, and quality (CSO Regulation Group, April 2010).  
An independent evaluation of materials and user forums has not been done to date.   
